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Abstract 
In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-
party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give 
loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment 
but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to 
lenders’ votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according 
to borrowers’ votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the 
lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average 
earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ 
a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting 
and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task 
changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.  
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1. Introduction 
State enforcement—forcing parties to fulfill their obligations—makes impersonal exchange 
possible and has no good substitutes. In fact, it is required for impersonal exchange between 
anonymous parties, which is the hallmark of developed market economies (North and Thomas, 
1973; Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990; Seabright, 2004), as empirically examined by Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith (2005). Lack of enforcement compels traders in developing economies to rely 
on personal exchange, wasting trade opportunities, as publicized by Hernando de Soto (1989, 2000) 
and measured by the World Bank Doing Business reports. Moreover, good substitutes for State 
enforcement do not exist. Relational contracts are infeasible for anonymous exchange and, when 
feasible, they require the abstention or “forbearance” of the State (Williamson, 1991), which often 
heavily constrains them through judicial rulings and mandatory laws so that relational contracts 
always operate “in the shadow of the law” (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979). 
Enforcement failure is possible because enforcers—both judges and lawmakers—enjoy 
substantial discretion. In a world of incomplete contracts, enforcers not only enforce but also define 
the obligations of the parties in a specific scenario—in a sense, they “complete” the contract ex 
post; and this double task makes it possible for them to disguise enforcement failures as contractual 
“completions”. At a deeper level, the State, as a sovereign actor, is always in a position of power 
over contractual parties. The risk of enforcement failure is therefore ever present, with judges 
potentially allowing contractual defaults or, generally, States failing to enforce contracts. Claims of 
such failures abound. For instance, weak enforcement of foreclosures by judges hinders mortgage 
lending in developing countries (Field and Torero, 2006; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2006), as farm 
foreclosure moratoria did in the 25 US states that enacted it in the 1930s (Alston, 1984).  
Given that enforcement failure can thwart markets, societies implement institutional 
arrangements to limit the discretion of enforcers and shape their decisions. Judges are generally 
restrained by judicial precedents and the possibility of appeals. Legislators are limited by 
constitutional rules. Specific arrangements also operate on both judges and legislators. For example, 
judges may be elected or appointed, and their careers may depend on seniority or on merit 
assessments. Similarly, different political structures—for instance, allocations of voting rights, from 
limited to universal suffrage—might motivate legislators differently. 
These alternative institutional arrangements may produce different enforcement results based on 
two factors: allocation of enforcement rights and incentives. First, each institutional arrangement 
allocates enforcement rights differently within society. For instance, states may grant voting rights 
to an elite of property owners, to all males, or to all citizens. These differences in constituencies 
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make lenders or borrowers, employers or employees, or landlords or tenants more or less influential 
in defining the degree of contract enforcement. In the 1930s, US states suffering the most severe 
farm distress were more likely to enact mortgage moratoria. Similarly, elected US judges tend to 
rule in favor of local businesses (Tabarrok and Helland, 1999). Second, some institutional 
arrangements may provide decision makers with different incentive functions, linking their 
enforcement decisions to their personal compensation. So defined, incentives could predictably 
encourage or discourage enforcement.  
To analyze these issues, we designed an experiment with an economy composed of three 
classes of actors: “lenders,” “borrowers” and “judges.” Transactions between lenders and borrowers 
generate surplus. Hence the economy reaches a socially optimal outcome when everyone completes 
a transaction. Decisions are made sequentially and when borrowers do not return “loans,” judges 
can enforce repayment or accommodate default. We examine the consequence of allocating 
enforcement rights to one of the three classes while always giving the deciding class incentives for 
optimal enforcement.  
More specifically, our experimental treatments represent three institutional arrangements in 
which different classes of individuals hold the key decision rights. In the “GDP” treatment, we pay 
judges proportionally to the aggregate income of the economy. In contrast, in two “constituency” 
treatments (lender and borrower), we pay judges according to how close they rule to the average 
vote of their constituency class. In all three treatment, judges therefore have formal enforcement 
powers, as they are free to enforce or not, but in constituency treatments a different class of subjects 
controls enforcement in actual fact, which is why we will talk of allocating enforcement rights to 
different classes of subjects: to judges in the GDP treatment,1 lenders in the lender constituency 
treatment and borrowers in the borrower constituency treatment.  
In all three treatments, the socially optimal outcome is an equilibrium—in other words, those 
holding enforcement rights benefit from promoting enforcement, because their personal incentives 
are aligned with aggregate efficiency. All relevant information to identify the socially optimal 
outcome is public. In two treatments (borrower constituency and GDP) other equilibria exist where 
enforcement is low and the market disappears; hence, there is an issue of coordination.  
We find that the degree of enforcement does depend on how enforcement rights are allocated, to 
the extent that when borrowers control judges, enforcement falls below the threshold that makes 
transactions profitable, and very soon no transactions take place and the market disappears. In the 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we will be talking about “judges”, but the position of the members of this class is also close to that of 
legislators. 
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GDP treatment, judges’ enforcement is high and the level of transactions is close to optimal. We 
claim that these differences in enforcement are caused by differences in the difficulty of the 
problem in each treatment, which makes a particular outcome salient in a given institutional 
arrangement, but not in another.2 
 When we pay judges according to borrowers’ votes, borrowers control judges but are unable to 
grasp that it is in their best interest to ensure a minimum profit to lenders. They thus motivate 
judges not to enforce, judges follow suit, loans dry up and borrowers’ earnings are extremely low. 
In contrast, when lenders control judges, lenders encourage enforcement, the economy achieves full 
efficiency and borrowers end up better both in terms of absolute and relative income.  
Our experiment is a variation of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) where choices are binary and 
there is a sort of final litigation stage as in Bohnet et al. (2001). We also used repeated interactions 
with random endings (Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006). To rule out the feasibility of relational 
contracts (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2003), we hid subject identifiers. In addition to this trust game, 
our study includes a guessing game to estimate subjects’ reasoning ability (Nagel, 1995; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford, 2006) and a static game similar to Engelmann and Strobel (2004) to elicit 
subjects’ inequality aversion and altruism.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. 
Section 3 defines the theoretical predictions, detailing the different equilibria in both the one-shot 
and the indefinitely repeated game. Section 4 presents the main results of the experiment, chiefly 
that when borrowers enjoy enforcement rights they are trapped in an inferior equilibrium. Section 5 
analyzes possible explanations for the main results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Experimental design 
Overall, 189 undergraduate students from Purdue University participated in 15 sessions or 
“economies” (Table 1). Each session included three parts: part 1 measured other-regarding 
                                                 
2 There is evidence that people suffer cognitive failures in different domains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Nagel, 
1995; Camerer, 2003). If enforcers suffer similar failures, the allocation of enforcement rights may matter. This concern 
may seem minor since enforcers are experts, such as judges and politicians. However, experts in other fields also suffer 
biases (McNeil et al., 1982). Furthermore, some studies find that judges suffer from “anchoring,” “hindsight,” 
“overconfidence,” “framing” and “representativeness” biases (Guthrie, Rachlinksi and Wistrich, 2001). As for 
politicians, their possible biases add to those of citizens (Westen et al., 2006), who ultimately drive the incentives of 
politicians. Furthermore, it is politicians who design the incentives of judges. Thus, the cognitive dimension of the 
contract enforcement problem is ultimately defined by the ability of non-expert citizens to understand the problem. 
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preferences, part 2 measured reasoning ability, and part 3, which constitutes the core of the 
experiment, had subjects interacting in a trust game with third-party enforcement.  
Part 3 was a repeated trust game between a lender (trustor) and a borrower (trustee) to which we 
added a judge (third-party enforcer, Figure 1). At the beginning of a session, 15 subjects randomly 
assumed a role, and 5 acted as lenders, 5 as borrowers, and 5 as judges—all of them retaining the 
same role until the end of the session. In period one, subjects were randomly partitioned into 5 
groups. Each group included one lender, one borrower, and one judge, who interacted together for 
the period. After each period, groups were randomly rematched; subjects ignored the identity of the 
people in their group (stranger protocol). We will refer to a session as an economy.  
The modified trust game had the following five features. First, there was a built-in inequality in 
minimum earnings, which were 50 tokens for lenders, 16 for borrowers, and in-between for judges. 
An experimental token was worth $0.45. 
Second, choices were binary. The lender (trustor) could either lend (send 10 tokens) or save 
(send 0), the borrower (trustee) could either comply (return 17 tokens to the trustor) or default 
(return nothing to the trustor), and the judge could either enforce or accommodate the borrowers’ 
default (Figure 1). The implicit wealth multiplier was 3.4 and final earnings for (lender, borrower) 
could be either (60, 16) for saving, (67, 33) for repaid trust, or (50, 50) for betrayed trust.  
Third, subjects knew the “social history” of their economy, which includes all subjects in the 
room, but did not observe individual decisions and could not therefore develop reputations. More 
specifically, a subject learned the past actions of economy participants in aggregate form and not 
the individual histories of the people in her group. At the end of each period, each subject observed 
not only the choices implemented in her own group of three subjects, but also the overall number of 
loans given in the economy and how many of them ended in default; the number of judges that 
chose to enforce; and the average earnings of lenders, borrowers and judges.  
Fourth, the decision of the judge was elicited with the strategy method: she made a decision 
every period, but the decision was implemented only when the lender had sent 10 tokens to the 
borrower and the borrower had defaulted. In all other cases, her decision was collected but not 
implemented. In addition, every period the judge was asked, with no money at stake, to state her 
beliefs about how many other judges in the economy (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) chose to enforce. As we will 
explain later, in a given period all judges earned the same amount, which varied according to the 
performance of all judges or the performance of the economy. Hence, they had a strong incentive to 
look at the social history of the economy. 
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Fifth, every period we asked lenders and borrowers to vote on what they would like judges to 
decide. These votes were labeled opinions in the instructions and might have payoff consequences 
for lenders and borrowers by influencing judges’ enforcement decisions in the constituency 
treatments, as will be clear later in the paper. The votes were given with reference to one generic 
judge in the economy, not specifically with reference to the judge matched with each respondent. At 
the end of each period, the votes of all lenders and all borrowers were announced as part of the 
social history.3  
This modified trust game was repeated for at least 20 periods. After every period above period 
20, a subject was asked to roll a dice. If the result was a six, the session was over; otherwise it 
continued. In expectation, this random stopping rule yielded 6 additional periods for a total duration 
of 26 periods. There were no practice periods. To preserve the inequality in earnings, only one 
period from part 3 was randomly selected for payment. 
Treatments. We introduced three main treatments that manipulated the payment schedule for 
judges: “lender constituency,” “borrower constituency,” and “GDP” (Table 1). A common feature 
of all three treatments was that judges were paid according to their collective performance, hence in 
a given period they all earned the same amount.  
Treatments differed in the compensation of judges:  
1) In lender constituency, judges’ payments depended on the agreement between judges’ 
decisions as a group and lenders’ votes as a group. More precisely, if the number of 
judges enforcing was equal to the number of lenders favoring enforcement, judges 
earned 50 tokens. For every person in disagreement, judges’ earnings were lowered by 5 
tokens. Hence, judges earned a minimum of 25 tokens. Borrowers’ votes were ignored. 
2) In borrower constituency, judges’ payments depended on the agreement between judges’ 
decisions as a group and borrowers’ votes as a group. More precisely, if the number of 
judges enforcing was equal to the number of borrowers also favoring enforcement, 
judges earned 50 tokens. For every person in disagreement, judges’ earnings were 
lowered by 5 tokens. Lenders’ votes were ignored. 
3) In GDP, judges earned the average of all lenders and borrowers in the economy. 
Therefore, what mattered was not just the earnings of the specific lender and borrower 
matched with that judge but the earnings of all 10 of them in the economy. Judges’ 
earnings could therefore vary between 38 and 50 tokens.  
                                                 
3 When voting, lenders and borrowers knew how many loans had been given and their earnings in the current period.  
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Within the borrower constituency and GDP treatments, we also implemented variants where 
some roles were replaced by pre-programmed computers. We refer to those as “robot borrower 
constituency” and “robot GDP,” and give a full description in the results section.  
In part 1 we elicited the preferences of all subjects with respect to equality and efficiency in a 
static context, along the lines of Engelmann and Strobel (2004). We showed each subject Table 2 
and Table 3 (without the last rows) and asked them to write their decisions on a personal card. Each 
table presented subjects a choice between alternative allocations of money among three persons 
(roles 1, 2, and 3). Subjects faced role uncertainty as they made these decisions because roles were 
assigned randomly at the end of the session. Participants were instructed to choose among options 
A, B, and C and then D, E, and F as if they knew they were Person 2. When computing earnings, we 
randomly formed groups and randomly assigned roles. Only the choice of the participant selected as 
person 2 mattered for deciding her group allocation. The choices of persons 1 and 3 were ignored. 
Half of the groups were paid according to choices made in Table 2 and the other to choices in Table 
3.  
In part 2 we ran a one-shot guessing game in which all subjects had to write a real number 
between 0 and 100 on their decision cards. They were informed that we would randomly form 
groups of three and would compute a target number for each group by taking two thirds of the 
group average. Within each group, the subject closest to her target number received 6 points, which 
were evenly split in case of a tie.  
At that point, the experimenter collected all decision cards and wrote the results for part 1 and 
part 2 on the cards, which were returned to the subjects at the end of the session. After reading the 
instructions for part 3, subjects completed a quiz on the rules for part 3 and the subjects who made 
the most mistakes in the quiz were excluded. They received $10 in addition to their part 1 and part 2 
earnings. A session included between 6 and 18 subjects (Table 1). Each subject participated in only 
one of the sessions between February and April 2006. Recruitment was done mostly in introductory 
economics classes. A session lasted on average less than two hours, including instruction reading. A 
participant earned on average $24, and earnings were paid privately at the end of a session. 
3. Theoretical predictions 
We now derive the theoretical predictions for a rational, self-interested agent. In part 1 the best 
choice is C in Table 2 and F in Table 3. In part 2, the Nash equilibrium is to choose the number 0. 
The prize is split equally and individual earnings are 2 points. We will now derive the Nash 
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equilibria for a simpler version of the experimental design used in part 34—both for a one-shot 
game and then for the indefinitely repeated game described in the previous section. Remember that 
decisions are sequential: first lenders decide, then borrowers, and finally judges. We assume that all 
agents are risk neutral and maximize their personal earnings. At the end of the section, we will 
discuss changes in the equilibria of part 3 when agents are risk averse or other-regarding. 
3.1. Preliminary considerations 
The one-period version of the trust game described in Section 2 comprises five lenders (ℓ), five 
borrowers (b) and five judges (j). Each participant takes two decisions at most:  
  (Iℓk, Vℓk), (Ibk, Vbk), (Ijk, Gjk) for k = 1, ..., 5  
Participants’ main decisions are binary {0,1} and we represent them through a set of “I” 
variables; for instance Iℓ2 = 1, Ib5 = 0, Ij3 = 1 denotes that lender 2 gave a loan, borrower 5 defaulted, 
and judge 3 forced the borrower to pay back. More generally, the first subscript of a variable 
denotes the role, while the second subscript identifies each of the 5 subjects playing each of the 3 
roles, k = 1, ..., 5. For lenders and borrowers, the “V” variables represent their vote about 
enforcement, either 0 or 1. For judges, the “G” variables are the guesses about the number of other 
judges deciding for enforcement, and can therefore take any integer value between 0 and 4. For 
example, when we observe Vℓ2 = 1, Vb5 = 0, Gj3 = 3, this means that lender 2 prefers a generic judge 
in the economy to enforce; borrower 5 prefers this generic judge to accommodate the borrower’s 
default; and, finally, judge 3 thinks that 3 of the other 4 judges in that particular economy would 
have enforced.  
In short, each participant first makes a choice about lending, compliance, or enforcement, and 
then states her opinion or guess on enforcement. The payoffs, {πℓk, πbk, πjk for k = 1, ..., 5}, which 
have already been explained in Section 2 and Figure 1, result from the interaction among subjects, 
taking into account who was matched with whom in the period. For specifying these interactions, 
we define functions m(k), which map each subject k to the other two subjects interacting with her.5 
Thus, the payoff of lender k ranges in [50, 67]: 
 πℓk  = 60 (1 – Iℓk ) + 67 ( Iℓk Ib,m(k)+ Iℓk(1 – Ib,m(k))Ij,m(k) ) + 50 (Iℓk(1 – Ib,m(k))(1 – Ij,m(k))  [1]. 
                                                 
4 For the theoretical predictions, we assume that (a) when making a choice, each judge knew how lenders and 
borrowers had voted; and (b) when voting, each borrower knew whether she had received a loan or not. On the 
contrary, in the experiment (a) judges learned how lenders and borrowers had voted only at the end of each period; and 
(b) before voting, borrowers did not know whether or not they were receiving a loan unless the number of loans was 
zero or five. 
5 When Iℓ,m(k)=0, we conventionally define Ibk=0.  
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The payoff of borrower k ranges in [16, 50]: 
 πbk = 16 (1 – Iℓ,m(k) ) + 33 ( Iℓ,m(k) Ibk+ Iℓ,m(k) (1 – Ibk)Ij,m(k) ) + 50 (Iℓ,m(k)(1 – Ibk)(1 – Ij,m(k))) [2]. 
The payoff of judge k under lender constituency ranges in [25, 50]: 
 πjk = 50 – 5 Σk=1,…,5 (Ijk – Vℓk)  [3]. 
The payoff of judge k under borrower constituency ranges in [25, 50]: 
 πjk = 50 – 5 Σk=1,…,5 (Ijk –Vbk) [4]. 
And the payoff of judge k under GDP ranges in [38, 50]: 
 πjk = 1/10  Σk=1,…,5 (πℓk + πbk) [5]. 
The economy can achieve the socially optimal outcome only when all lenders lend, as more 
loans increase the total earnings in the economy. We will rate outcomes according to what we label 
“surplus,” defined as the average payoff of all lenders and borrowers minus their initial endowment 
of 76 tokens (60+16). This surplus, which is a partial measure of social efficiency, since judges’ 
earnings are excluded, will range for each transaction between 24 (“high surplus”) when all lenders 
lend, and 0 (“low surplus”) when all lenders save.6 
The best choice for a lender is to lend when her expected payoff is higher than it would be if 
saving, E[πℓk|Iℓk = 1] > E[πℓk|Iℓk = 0]. Because a lender is anonymously matched with a borrower 
and a judge in the economy, the expected profitability of lending crucially depends on the expected 
“enforcement rate” in the economy, ER, defined as the ratio between the sum of loans returned 
(both voluntarily by borrowers or after judicial enforcement) and the sum of loans given:  
 ER = [Σk Ibk + (Σk Iℓk - Σk Ibk) Rj ] / (Σk Iℓk) [6].7 
The expected return on a loan depends on how many are voluntarily returned by borrowers (Σk Ibk) 
and, for those on default, the enforcement rate by judges, Rj = Σk Ijk /5. We remain agnostic about 
how these expectations are generated. In equilibrium, however, expectations should be fulfilled. 
                                                 
6 In the GDP treatment, surplus is proportional to the GDP of the economy. In the other two treatments, it is not. In an 
actual economy, judges are a small minority of agents and hence surplus would be a good approximation of the GDP of 
the economy. 
7 Given that this ratio is used by lenders to estimate their return from lending, Ilk is at least one and the denominator is 
always positive. The risk attitude of lenders has a clear impact on the enforcement threshold [6] that is acceptable for 
giving loans. The more risk averse lenders are, the higher the threshold, ER** > ER*. This makes no difference for 
equilibrium in lender constituency, given the 100% enforcement rate in equilibrium. Instead, it makes some difference 
in the other two treatments, although not major ones. In borrower constituency, there are still multiple equilibria. More 
precisely, there is a high-surplus equilibrium, which is unique, although now lenders earn less. Moreover, there are 
multiple low-surplus equilibria, which are now a larger set than before. Under GDP, the set of high-surplus equilibria 
gets smaller because ER** > ER*, while the set of low-surplus equilibria gets larger. 
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Lenders will lend only if they expect an enforcement rate above a certain Enforcement threshold, 
ER*:    
 E[πℓk|Iℓk=1] > E[πℓk|Iℓk=0]  ⇔ 67 E[ER] + 50 (1– E[ER]) > 60 ⇔ E[ER] > E[ER*] = 10/17 ≈ 0.5882 
Lending is profitable when more than about 58.82% of the loans are returned. This enforcement 
rate can be satisfied with various combinations of borrowers’ and judges’ choices. For instance, 
when at least three judges decide for compliance, the threshold is met for any number of voluntary 
returns. When at least three loans out of five are voluntary returned, the threshold is met for any 
judicial ruling (also for 3/4, 2/3 or 1/1). When at least two loans out of five are voluntary returned, 
we need two judges ruling for enforcement, and so on.8 
3.2. Equilibria in the one-shot game 
Although subjects in the experiment face repeated interactions, we first analyze the equilibria 
for the simpler case of one-period interaction.  
In lender constituency, there exists a unique sequential equilibrium where all lenders vote for 
compliance. It is in the judges’ best interest to adhere to the lenders’ opinions and rule for 
compliance. Hence lenders can count on a 100% enforcement rate. It follows that all lenders have 
an incentive to give loans, while borrowers can choose any action. The key players here are the 
lenders, because they control the third-party enforcer. We will adopt the following notation to 
describe the aggregate outcomes in equilibrium, (Σk Iℓk, Σk Vℓk), (Σk Ibk, Σk Vbk), (Σk Ijk) = (5, 5), (0, -
), (5), where the terms in parentheses highlight decisions of lenders (number of loans, number of 
votes for compliance), borrowers (number of voluntary returns, votes for compliance), and judges 
(number of enforcement decisions), respectively. The symbol “-” stands for any choice. We omit 
from the above description judges’ guesses about other judges, G, because they entail no payoff 
consequences in any of the treatments. The equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure 
strategy and yields a high surplus outcome with payoffs πℓ = 67 for lenders, πb = 33 for borrowers, 
and πj = 50 for judges. 
There is also a unique sequential equilibrium in borrower constituency, but it yields a low-
surplus outcome, which is not socially optimal. Now the key players are the borrowers, because 
they have control of the third-party enforcer. If lenders give loans, borrowers always have an 
incentive to default and to vote for default. Hence, in equilibrium, lenders do not give loans and 
                                                 
8 The enforcement threshold is met (ER>58.82%) with four loans when two loans are voluntarily returned and one 
judge rules for enforcement; with three loans, when one loan is voluntarily returned and two judges rule for 
enforcement; with two loans, when one loan is voluntarily returned and one judge rules for enforcement. 
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judges accommodate. The equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure strategy and 
generates aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, 0), (0) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj = 50. Given that 
borrowers would benefit from receiving loans, one may suggest that they could “promise” to vote 
for loan enforcement. However, such promises are not credible because borrowers and judges 
choose after lenders have already given the loan, and hence a “high-surplus” outcome is not an 
equilibrium.  
Under GDP, there exist multiple equilibria. When judges take a decision, their earnings have 
already been determined. That is the crucial point. For any pattern of lenders’ and borrowers’ 
decisions, self-regarding judges have no incentive to rule for either enforcement or default. One 
could assume that judges will choose randomly because it makes no difference to them. In that case, 
lending becomes unprofitable because an enforcement probability r = 0.5 < ER* drives the 
economy to a low-surplus equilibrium. This equilibrium is supported through a symmetric mixed 
strategy and generates aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, -), (5r) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj = 
38. Alternatively, one could argue that a judges’ equilibrium strategy is always to enforce. In that 
case, lending is profitable and drives the economy to a high-surplus equilibrium. Judges have no 
incentives to deviate from this strategy. This equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure 
strategy and generates aggregate outcomes (5, 5), (0, -), (5) with payoffs πℓ = 67, πb = 33, and πj = 
50. Any level of enforcement from 0 through 5 can be an equilibrium.  
When judges have a preference for equality, the multiplicity of equilibria under GDP 
disappears. As we will see later, we find widespread empirical preference for equality of earnings, 
and that introduces a ranking among outcomes, which leads toward a low-surplus equilibrium. The 
equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure strategy where no judge enforces, and generates 
aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, -), (0) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj = 38. 
3.3. Equilibria in the indefinitely repeated game 
If the game is played repeatedly, new equilibria may appear because subjects consider the effect 
that their current decisions may have on the future decisions of all subjects. After the first 20 
periods of interaction, we use a random stopping rule with a probability 1/6 of continuing for at 
least another period. It follows that the overall expected length of the interaction is 26 periods. At 
any point in time, however, subjects expect that the interaction will continue for at least 6 periods. 
In lender constituency, playing the game repeatedly yields the same high-surplus  outcomes as 
the one-shot scenario, (5, 5), (0, -), (5). A unique sequential equilibrium in symmetric pure 
strategies still exists. 
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In borrower constituency, multiple equilibria exist, which yield either high-surplus or low-
surplus outcomes. In the repeated game, borrowers need to balance the immediate gain they obtain 
by voting and inducing judges to accommodate against the future losses this will cause if, as a 
consequence, lenders will lend less in the following periods.  
The high-surplus equilibria exist because in the repeated game, lenders can “threaten” to switch 
from lending to saving in future periods unless borrowers ensure lenders a profit. The borrowers’ 
tradeoff is such that they benefit from voting for enforcement because lenders would react to the 
enforcement level going below the critical threshold by executing their threat and halting lending 
for at least t periods. To calculate t, let us compare the equilibrium earnings that borrowers get over 
a future of T periods in two situations—when they vote to maintain 100% enforcement and when 
(in the current period) they decide to switch to 0% enforcement. The following inequality must hold 
for any generic period,  
 E[πbk |Σk Vbk = 5] > E[πbk |Σk Vbk = 0] 
 33 T > 50 + 16 t + 33 (T – t)  ⇔  t* > 50/17 ≈ 2.94 [7]. 
That is, borrowers always profit from voting for enforcement if lenders react to default by 
halting lending for three or more periods, which is always a viable option because their expected 
horizon is at least six periods.  
Formally, the high-surplus equilibrium in borrower constituency is supported by any mixed 
strategy with an expected fraction of borrowers voting for enforcement, r = ER*. The aggregate 
outcomes in equilibrium, (5, -), (0, 5r), (3), have expected payoffs E[πℓ] ≈  60, E[πb] ≈ 40, and 
45 < E[πj] ≤ 50.9 Any r > ER* is not an equilibrium because there is room for a borrower to 
switch—sometimes to vote for default and increase her expected earnings. Instead, for any r < ER*, 
lenders make a loss and will all quit lending. 
The low-surplus equilibria in borrower constituency is supported by strategies with an expected 
fraction of borrowers voting for enforcement, r < 33/68. The aggregate outcomes in equilibrium, (0, 
-), (0, 5r), (k), have expected payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and 45 < E[πj] ≤ 50.  The parameter k is the 
expected number of judges enforcing.10 The one-shot equilibrium with zero-enforcement is a 
special case. Notice that for r∈(33/68, ER*), an equilibrium does not exist, because in this interval, 
                                                 
9 For borrowers employing a symmetric mixed strategy, r =ER* and for judges adopting an asymmetric pure strategy of 
3 always enforcing, E[πℓ]= 60.20, E[πb]=39.80, and E[πj]=45.83. In the text, we provide an indicative interval that 
contains expected payoffs when also using other strategies to support a high-surplus outcome. 
10 That is, k=0 for r≤0.1; k=1 for 0.1≤r≤0.3; k=2 for r≥0.3. See also footnote 9. 
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a one-borrower switch in strategy from voting for compliance with probability r to voting with 
probability one will make lending profitable; hence, 4r+1 < 5⋅ER* must hold. 
Under GDP, multiple equilibria exist, which yield either high- or low-surplus outcomes. The 
high-surplus equilibria are supported by strategies with an expected fraction of judges ruling for 
enforcement at or above the enforcement threshold, q∈[ER*, 1]. The aggregate outcome in 
equilibrium is (5, -), (0, -), (5q) with expected payoffs 60 ≤ E[πℓ] ≤ 67, 33 ≤ E[πb] ≤ 40, and 
πj = 50.  
The low-surplus equilibria under GDP are supported by strategies with an expected fraction of 
judges ruling for enforcement, q, less than 33/68. The aggregate outcome in equilibrium is (0, -), (0, 
-), (5q) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj =38. The one-shot equilibria with zero-enforcement are 
a special case. Notice that for q∈(33/68, ER*), no equilibrium exists. In that interval, a one-judge 
switch in strategy from ruling for compliance with probability q to probability one will make 
lending profitable; hence, 4q+1 < 5⋅ER* must hold.  
3.4. Equilibrium selection criteria 
While the equilibrium in lender constituency is unique, we have multiple equilibria in borrower 
constituency and GDP. We put forward possible selection criteria to solve the coordination problem 
that characterizes the latter two treatments in the indefinitely repeated setting. First we discuss 
Pareto-dominance and then the effect of other-regarding preferences.  
Under borrower constituency and GDP there are both low- and high-surplus equilibria. If 
subjects use Pareto-dominance as their focal criterion, they will avoid low-surplus equilibria, which 
would leave only one equilibrium in borrower constituency (5, -), (0, 5r), (3) with r = ER*, and a 
multiplicity of high-surplus equilibria in GDP. 
When subjects have other-regarding preferences, there may be two effects: first, the ranking of 
equilibria may be different from self-regarding subjects; and second, the equilibrium set itself may 
change. We will maintain the assumption that all agents have identical preferences, although now 
they may be other-regarding, i.e. exhibit a preference for efficiency, or equality, or both.  
A subject has a preference for efficiency if she is willing to pay a cost in terms of personal 
earnings in order to increase the aggregate earnings in the economy more than such cost. When 
everyone has a preference for efficiency, the equilibrium ranking coincides with the Pareto-
dominance criterion and the equilibrium sets of the three treatments do not change. In short, 
preferences for efficiency reinforce the focality of high-surplus equilibria. 
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A subject has a preference for equality if she is willing to pay a cost in terms of personal 
earnings in order to increase the equality of earnings among the subjects in the economy, in 
particular to increase the absolute and relative earnings of the poorest persons in the economy (the 
borrowers). The closest model for our preference specification is Charness and Rabin (2002). The 
models of Fehr and Smidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are also related. As we will 
explain in the following sections, inequality aversion reinforces the focality of high-surplus 
equilibria in all treatments. In addition, inequality aversion changes the equilibrium set in the GDP 
treatment. 
All low-surplus equilibria exhibit a higher inequality than all high-surplus equilibria, because 
the poorest subjects (borrowers) always earn 16 tokens in low-surplus outcomes (27% as much as 
lenders) and earn between 33 and 50 in high-surplus outcomes (49%–100% as much as lenders). 
Therefore, inequality averse subjects should be more likely than self-regarding subjects to 
coordinate on a high-surplus equilibrium in both the GDP and borrower constituency treatments. 
In addition, when subjects are inequality averse, the set of equilibria for GDP changes and 
becomes identical to the set in borrower constituency. While self-regarding judges regard all high-
surplus outcomes equally, inequality-averse judges strictly prefer the outcome with the highest 
earnings for borrowers. As a consequence, GDP judges will choose the lowest possible enforcement 
rate, r = ER*, which becomes the only high-surplus equilibria. This change is particularly important 
because, on one hand, it simplifies the coordination task in GDP and, on the other hand, it makes 
GDP more comparable to borrower constituency.11 
Deeper changes in the equilibrium set may occur when all subjects have “strong” other-
regarding preferences.12 The unique equilibrium in lender constituency may shift to a different 
high-surplus outcome with an enforcement rate lower than 100%, although never to a low-surplus 
outcome.13 The set of low-surplus equilibria in GDP and borrower constituency may shrink and 
                                                 
11 The change in GDP equilibrium set is independent from the “strength” of inequality-averse preferences; judges incur 
no cost to lower the enforcement rate as long as the economy remains in a high-surplus outcome. Moreover, the change 
is independent from judges having both a preference for equality and efficiency. 
12 One can measure the strength of other-regarding preferences using the willingness to sacrifice personal earnings in 
order to achieve an other-regarding goal. If a subject is willing to pay 2 units to increase the total earnings of the 
economy by 10 units, we then say that her “efficiency multiplier” is 5 or lower. If she is willing to pay 3 units to 
increase the earnings of borrowers by 18 units, we also say that her “equality multiplier” is 6 or lower. The stronger the 
other-regarding preference, the lower its corresponding multiplier. 
13 Inequality-averse lenders would drive this change. If a lender votes to accommodate borrowers, she can expect a cost 
of 3.4 (i.e. 1/5 ⋅17), which will result in a gain of 17 for borrowers. There is no sacrifice in terms of efficiency, and the 
equality multiplier is 5. 
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may even disappear altogether.14 In conclusion, the likelihood of achieving a high-surplus 
equilibrium is unambiguously enhanced if subjects are other-regarding. 
4. Main results 
We present two sets of results from the experimental data. The main findings are Results 1 and 
2, which report the differences obtained across treatments in the surplus generated and in the 
distribution of earnings, with particular reference to the fact that borrower constituency falls 
consistently into the low-surplus equilibrium. Second, Results 3 through 7 explore possible reasons 
for these main findings and settle on a bounded rationality explanation. 
Result 1. Market surplus is remarkably different across treatments. In lender 
constituency, subjects reach 100 percent of the potential surplus, and in GDP they 
reach 69 percent, whereas in borrower constituency, they reach only 10 percent. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 provide support for Result 1. We define “market earnings” as the sum of 
borrowers’ and lenders’ earnings over all periods and all groups, and compute the “market surplus” 
subtracting from the market earnings the “market endowments” (that is, the sum over all periods 
and all groups of the 16 tokens that borrowers receive at the beginning of each period plus the 50 
tokens that lenders receive). Judges’ earnings are irrelevant in these two indicators. 
Both indicators differ widely across treatments. In lender constituency, the steady-state market 
surplus is at its predicted equilibrium level of 100%. In borrower constituency it is only 10%, close 
to the low-surplus equilibrium level of 0%, which suggests that subjects coordinated on their least-
preferred outcome. In the GDP treatment, subjects, despite facing an equilibrium set similar to 
borrower constituency, manage to achieve 69% of the potential surplus, which suggests that they 
attempt to coordinate on the high-surplus equilibria. These differences are significant at a 5% level 
using a one-tail Mann-Whitney test.15 
                                                 
14 Lenders with a concern for equality and/or efficiency would drive the change. For a lender, giving a loan entails an 
“opportunity cost” between 8.75 and 17, but will increase earnings in the economy by 34 and earnings of borrowers by 
an amount between 17 and 25.75. Given 0≤ ER <33/68, the cost for a lender is 17(1-ER) and the gain for a borrower is 
ER(33-16)+(1-ER)(50-16). The efficiency multiplier is in the interval [2, 3.9] and the equality multiplier is in [1.5, 1.9]. 
15 The p-values for different groupings of samples are: GDP vs. borrower constituency, p = 0.028; GDP including 
robots vs. borrower constituency including robots, p = 0.001; GDP only robots vs. borrower constituency only robots, 
p = 0.05. Although stark, differences with lender constituency are significant at a 10 percent level only because of the 
small sample size of lender constituency: vs. borrower constituency, p = 0.10; vs. GDP, p = 0.067. 
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On these and all the numbered results relative to part 3, we rely on statistics computed with 
reference to periods 11–20, which best represent the steady state. Data for periods 1–10 show some 
degree of learning—mainly by judges in GDP and by lenders in both borrower and lender 
constituencies. This learning makes the contrast between treatments less stark. For periods above 
20, comparisons between average values are distorted because the random stopping rule produced 
sessions of uneven length. Table 4 reports some basic statistics, including those for the “discarded” 
periods. Table 4 also includes the results for the two “robot” variants, which will be described after 
Result 4. 
Result 2. Borrowers earn their smallest share of market earnings under borrower 
constituency. The share is higher under lender constituency and GDP. The conclusion 
is similar when one considers borrowers’ absolute earnings instead of the relative 
share. 
Table 4, Figure 3 and Figure 4 support Result 2. Paradoxically, borrowers end up worse off 
under borrower constituency when they hold voting rights that command enforcement than in the 
other treatments. When lenders “control” judges, borrowers’ earnings are significantly higher both 
in absolute and in relative terms. Borrowers’ shares are 24.0% under borrower constituency vs. 
33.0% under lender constituency, and borrowers’ absolute earnings are 18.8 vs. 33.0 tokens, 
respectively. In the GDP treatment, borrowers also fare well, enjoying a marginal increase in their 
share of earnings (33.2%) with respect to lender constituency, but suffering a small decline in their 
absolute earnings (30.8). These differences are significant at a 5% level using a one-tail Mann-
Whitney test.16 
5. Explaining our main results 
We will now examine three conjectures to explain our main results 1 and 2: (a) other-regarding 
preferences; (b) coordination problems; and (c) difficulties in understanding market interactions. 
This examination will show that other-regarding preferences and coordination problems do not 
reasonably explain our main results. Conjecture (c) best explains the data by employing a steps-of-
reasoning model to capture the difficulties in understanding market interactions. 
                                                 
16 With one exception, the p-values for the comparison on either absolute or relative borrowers’ income are the same as 
for the comparison for market surplus. The exception is that there is no significant difference between lender 
constituency and GDP. 
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Result 3. Almost half of our subjects show some concern for equality of earnings and 
about half have some concern for overall efficiency. Only 21% of them are strictly self-
regarding. 
Table 2 and Table 3 provide support for Result 3, which refers to all participants in part 3 (21% 
is the proportion of subjects choosing C in Table 2 and F in Table 3). The presence of subjects with 
other-regarding preferences suggest that these preferences might have some effect on the main 
results obtained. In addition, as already noted in the theory section, the presence of a large fraction 
of subjects concerned for equality makes the equilibrium sets for the GDP and borrower 
constituency treatments identical. Note in particular that in any of the GDP sessions, there were 
either two or three judges with a concern for equality.17 
Result 4. Other-regarding preferences affect subjects’ choices but do not drive the 
differences across treatments in terms of market surplus and distribution of market 
earnings. When some roles are replaced by pre-programmed robots, the differences 
between borrower constituency and GDP treatments remain equally strong. 
Some of the evidence obtained in part 3 might also be driven by other-regarding concerns. For 
instance, lenders who lend when enforcement rates are well below ER* could simply be concerned 
with efficiency or equality (Table 5). Similarly, judges who do not enforce in the GDP treatment 
could be reflecting their concern for equality. 
On the other hand, other choices are hardly consistent with other-regarding concerns. Most 
importantly, subjects in borrower constituency did not have the high-surplus equilibrium, which is 
also the most equal, as their focal outcome. In lender constituency, there is also no evidence of 
other-regarding behavior on the side of either lenders or judges. 
In order to fully rule out the impact of other-regarding preferences, we used two variants of the 
treatments where we kept humans playing as key actors but replaced the other humans with robots: 
• Robot borrower constituency: In a variation of the borrower constituency treatment, we 
keep humans as borrowers and introduce robot lenders and robot judges. Robot lenders 
will lend whenever they expect a profit. They base profit expectations on the past 
average enforcement in the market. Some lender robots consider only decisions made in 
the last period, while others consider up to four. Robot judges rule in perfect accordance 
to borrowers’ opinions. 
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• Robot GDP: In a variation of the GDP treatment, we keep humans as judges and 
introduce robot lenders and robot borrowers. Robot lenders are programmed the same as 
in the previous variation. Robot borrowers always default. 
Results are displayed in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and in Table 4. In the robot variants, the 
five subjects in a session are the only ones paid; hence, concerns for efficiency are perfectly aligned 
with their own self interest, while concerns for other persons should have no impact. Yet, the 
differences between borrower constituency and GDP change only marginally from within human to 
within robot variant economies. The differences in terms of market surplus are 59 (human) vs. 57 
(robot) percentage points and in terms of share of market earnings are 9 vs. 7 percentage points. We 
focus on these differences in order to maintain constant the behavior of lenders, which were humans 
in some cases and robots in the other cases because, as we explain immediately below, the naivety 
of our robot lenders is responsible for the higher market surplus achieved by humans in both robot 
variations.18  
In borrower constituency, market surplus increases from 10% in the human variation to 40% in 
the robot variation (Table 4). The main reason for this increase lies in our choice of backward-
looking robot lenders, which allowed borrowers to sustain a pattern of cycles of 
enforcement/lending switching into no enforcement/no lending and back to enforcement/lending 
throughout a session (Figure 5). Because of their design, robot lenders could be fooled throughout a 
whole session, while even the most optimistic human lenders seem to have understood the strategy 
after one or two cycles, and completely stopped giving loans (Figure 6).19 As a consequence, while 
market surplus was stable over time with robot lenders, it steadily declined with human lenders. In 
addition, we still observed the paradox that borrowers’ absolute earnings were lower in robot 
borrower constituency than in robot GDP (Table 4). Borrowers in robot borrower constituency 
could have imitated the enforcement strategy followed by judges in GDP and achieve higher 
payoffs, but they do not. This fact also supports that subjects are boundedly rational with evidence 
that cannot be contaminated by other-regarding factors. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
17 In one session, only two judges were concerned for equality, which implies that there are still multiple high-surplus 
equilibria, although the set is much smaller than before, [0.588, 0.6] instead of [0.588, 1]. 
18 Specific other-regarding preferences cannot explain the results either. If subjects care only about the 50/50 outcome, 
borrower constituency still fare badly in comparison to GDP (an average of 0.33 loans per period versus 0.9). If 
borrowers are spiteful toward lenders, that could explain the results only when assuming an unrealistically high level of 
spite, because in the steady state a borrower must pay 17 tokens to lower a lender’s earnings by 7 tokens. Evidence 
from other experiments (Levine, 1998) suggests that spite should not reach the degree required to take such action. 
19 The correlation coefficients between number of loans and borrowers’ opinions in the same period are –0.29 in 
borrower constituency and –0.44 in robot borrower constituency. Borrowers know the number of loans given in the 
period before stating their opinion about enforcement. 
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As conjecture (a) is not supported by the data, we turn to conjecture (b). While lender 
constituency has a unique equilibrium, the other two treatments have multiple equilibria; hence 
subjects may coordinate their choices poorly. First, subjects’ choices could be badly coordinated 
with other subjects playing the same role, a failure that may affect borrowers’ voting in borrower 
constituency and judges’ enforcement choices in GDP. Result 5 addresses this issue. Second, within 
the borrower constituency treatment, judges could suffer a coordination failure in enforcement 
choices while matching the voting behavior of borrowers. Result 6 addresses this issue. 
Result 5. When some roles are replaced by pre-programmed robots, subjects readily 
solve any coordination issue. 
The two robot variants suggest that subjects playing the same role, judges or borrowers, 
coordinated successfully. In the robot GDP sessions, judges learn to coordinate on a high-surplus 
equilibrium (Figure 7). Their task is comparable to the one in the GDP variant with all human 
subjects. In the robot borrower constituency, although borrowers may appear erratic, they are 
actually coordinating on a more sophisticated pattern of cycles (Figure 5). In particular, borrowers 
behave anti-cyclically toward robot lenders. When robot lenders have given many loans, borrowers 
vote less frequently for compliance. Eventually the loans dry up, borrowers increasingly vote for 
compliance again, and then robot lenders start giving loans once more. 
Result 6. Our judges responded well to the incentives provided by the institutional 
setup, learning to enforce in the GDP treatment and ruling closely to the voting of the 
relevant constituency in each of the constituency treatments. 
Support for Result 6 is shown in Figure 8 and Table 5. The judges in our experiment decide 
very differently in each of the three treatments, adapting very well to the different incentives given 
by each of them. First, under GDP, judges perform poorly in the first periods (they enforce on 
average 49.3% in periods 1–10) but learn to enforce transactions over time (the rate of enforcement 
increases to 69.3% in periods 11–20), sustaining the market and increasing the earnings of all 
participants. Second, under borrower and lender constituencies, judges on average rule closely 
following the opinions of their constituency, as shown in Figure 8.20 The transmission is perfect in 
lender constituency (i.e., judges always enforce), while it is close in borrower constituency, with 
averages of 1.5 borrowers voting for enforcement and 1.87 judges ruling for enforcement. This 
                                                 
20 Furthermore, learning seems to happen faster than in the GDP treatment.  
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discrepancy would bias results in favor of the high-surplus equilibrium and hence judges in 
borrower constituency cannot be blamed for the low-surplus results. 
After having examined conjectures (a) and (b), we finally look at conjecture (c) in Result 7 
below. 
Result 7. The difficulty of actors to make multiple steps of reasoning provides a 
selection criterion to explain a high-surplus outcome in the GDP treatment and a low-
surplus outcome in the lender constituency treatment.  
Although the main results in the GDP and borrower constituency treatments are compatible with 
the theoretical predictions of Section 3, subjects’ focal outcome was different depending on the 
institutional arrangement. We argue that the selection criterion is driven by the difficulty actors 
experience in making multiple steps of reasoning.  
We operationalize the cognitive difficulty of each treatment using two variables: (1) the number 
of steps of reasoning that the key actors have to make in order to predict market outcomes—
specifically, the number of decisions to be made by other subjects and which the key actors have to 
predict; and (2) the correspondence between the immediate impact and the distant effect of the 
choices made by the key actors. According to these two variables, we can rank treatments as follow:   
• Lender constituency is an “easy” treatment. (1) Lenders are the key actors and face one 
step of reasoning (i.e. when voting, a lender has to predict how judges will decide). (2) 
Furthermore, lenders get an immediate benefit from voting for enforcement. Hence there 
is alignment between the immediate and distant impact of voting for enforcement in the 
current period.  
• GDP is a “moderately difficult” treatment. (1) Judges are the key actors and also face 
one step of reasoning (i.e. when choosing on enforcement, a judge has to predict 
lenders’ reactions). (2) Judges face an additional difficulty, however, because their 
decisions have no immediate effect on earnings—judges’ incentives come from lenders’ 
reaction in the following periods. Hence there is a partial misalignment between 
immediate and distant incentives. 
• Borrower constituency is a “difficult” treatment. (1) Borrowers are the key actors and 
face two steps of reasoning. When voting, a borrower first has to predict how judges will 
decide and, second, how lenders will react to judges’ enforcement decisions. (2) 
Furthermore, in the high-surplus equilibria, there is a stark conflict between immediate 
and distant effects, as enforcement could produce an immediate loss and a distant gain—
 20
by voting for enforcement, a borrower could indirectly cause an expected negative 
impact on her period earnings. 
When agents do an infinite number of steps of reasoning, the above ranking is irrelevant. Our 
subjects instead are characterized by a limited number of iterations of reasoning, which we 
measured in the experiment through the guessing game of part 2. As reported in Table 6, about 36% 
did either zero or one step of reasoning. When subjects do a limited number of steps of reasoning, 
we predict that every time short-run and long-run incentives of the key actors are misaligned, their 
choices will be closer to their short-run incentives, which is exactly what we observe in the data 
(Table 5). 
Empirical evidence at the individual level, provided  by the regression results shown in Table 7 
and Table 8, illustrate that the choices key actors made in part 3 depended on how many iterations 
of reasoning they completed in part 1. In the GDP treatment, judges with zero iterations of 
reasoning enforced significantly less than other judges. This pattern holds both for the human and 
robot variants of the GDP treatment and irrespective of whether we consider all periods of a session 
or just those where each judge’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not reaching the zero-profit 
enforcement threshold, ER* (Table 7, columns 1, 2, 5). Judges also learned over time the need to be 
at least above ER*. 
In the borrower constituency treatment, borrowers with zero or one iterations of reasoning voted 
less frequently for enforcement than other borrowers. This result is particularly significant in the 
robot variant (Table 8, columns 7, 8). There were two interesting differences in comparison with the 
GDP treatment, however. First, the cutoff was zero iterations for the GDP treatment and one 
iteration for the borrower constituency treatment, which directly mirrors the ranking of treatments’ 
cognitive difficulty that we gave previously. Second, there was no evidence of learning in the 
borrower constituency treatment. Although borrowers in borrower constituency adjusted in the 
correct direction to the observed voluntary return rates in the economy, the adjustment was 
insufficient to move into a high-surplus equilibrium, despite the remarkable incentives to do so. 
Although based on a small sample size, these regressions exhibit an overall pattern that points 
toward the difficulty subjects have in understanding the systematic consequences of their immediate 
choices within a market mechanism. Depending on the institutional arrangement, some of the 
outcomes in the equilibrium set were easier for subjects to achieve than others.  
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6. Conclusions 
We designed an experiment to examine how different political and judicial institutions may fail 
to produce enforcement and thus make market transactions impossible. With enforcement, the 
market flourishes, without enforcement, the market disappears. We argue that this variability is 
caused by the difficulty of the social problem defined by each set of institutions. Our institutions 
allocate enforcement rights to different classes of people—classes that are defined by their role as 
parties to a credit transaction, and for which understanding the systemic consequences of 
enforcement is more or less difficult. We observe that those institutions allocating enforcement 
rights to parties facing an “easy” problem with respect to enforcement are successful in supporting 
the market. On the contrary, markets disappear when the institutions allocate enforcement rights to 
parties facing a more serious problem with respect to enforcement, and this is irrespective of how 
much these parties could benefit from sustaining market transactions. 
Our experiment simulates a credit market with two transacting parties and a third-party enforcer. 
A series of anonymous transactions take place between rich lenders and poor borrowers, with pairs 
meeting at random in the economy. If no transaction takes place, a lender earns more than three 
times as much as a borrower. Each bilateral transaction always generates a surplus; hence, the 
economy reaches full efficiency when everyone completes a transaction. Each lender can lend to a 
borrower, and when the borrower voluntarily returns the loan, the surplus is split, with most of it 
going to the borrower. After this mutually beneficial transaction, inequality is reduced, with a 
borrower holding about half the wealth of a lender. When a borrower defaults, the judge (third 
party) can either force the borrower to repay the loan or accommodate the default. If the judge 
enforces repayment, the outcome is as with voluntary return. Instead, if the judge accommodates the 
default, the lender takes a net loss of the principal and the final earnings of the borrower are equal to 
those of the lender. In the economy, there is a panel of judges and every default is assigned 
randomly to one judge. Hence, when assessing the expected enforcement rate, lenders must 
consider the decisions of all judges in the panel.  
Lenders enjoy freedom to transact, as they are free to lend or not. Our judges also enjoy full 
discretion, as they are always free to enforce repayment or not, although they are paid differently 
depending on the institutional arrangement. We consider three alternative arrangements in which 
we allocate enforcement rights to different parties: in the lender constituency treatment, judges are 
paid according to lenders’ average voting on enforcement; in the borrower constituency treatment, 
according to borrowers’ average voting; and in the GDP treatment, according to the earnings of all 
lenders and borrowers in the economy. The key actors in each treatment—those to whom we 
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allocate enforcement rights—are therefore voting lenders, voting borrowers, and judges, 
respectively. 
In all treatments, these key actors always face individual incentives in line with high 
enforcement and full efficiency; however, the experimental results are mixed. Lenders did vote for 
enforcement and the economy reached full efficiency in the lender constituency treatment. Judges in 
the GDP treatment did enforce and ended up approaching full efficiency. In contrast, borrowers 
overwhelmingly voted not to enforce and, as a consequence, judges did not enforce in borrower 
constituency, so efficiency was extremely low in this treatment. Borrowers remained in an 
equilibrium where, paradoxically, their earnings were lower and income inequality higher than in 
lender constituency. 
We claim that these different results are driven by the varying difficulty of the problems that the 
key actors face across treatments. Lenders voting on enforcement face an easy task because voting 
for enforcement benefits them immediately and also helps sustaining future transactions. Therefore, 
immediate and systemic consequences coincide. In contrast, these two consequences go in opposite 
directions in borrower constituency, where, when asked to vote on enforcement, borrowers face a 
tradeoff between an easy-to-see immediate profit and a future systemic benefit.  
Our claim that the differences observed in enforcement levels are caused by differences in the 
difficulty of the problem created by each institutional arrangements is based on three 
considerations. First, concerns for efficiency or equality should move borrowers to vote for 
enforcement instead of accommodation. Second, when facing robot players instead of human 
agents, results are comparable. Results from robot treatments allow us to rule out a determinant role 
of other-regarding preferences and to discard coordination failure as an alternative explanation. 
Finally, we report econometric evidence linking decisions and steps-of-reasoning abilities at the 
individual level. We observe that those subjects iterations of reasoning in a separate task are the 
least likely to favor enforcement.  
The results are striking because all our decision makers, including borrowers, have incentives to 
enforce. In other words, all are interested in extending the market. We can therefore conclude that 
on our setup incentives are not an exhaustive criterion to design market-enforcing institutions. The 
key actors must also face a task they can handle easily. Consequently, the functioning of an 
impersonal market is fragile because some institutions pose agents problems that are too difficult, 
and their poor understanding of the systematic consequences of their decisions leads to enforcement 
failures that destroy the market. 
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The experimental methodology allows us to focus on enforcement of impersonal trade and 
remove many real-world details that could otherwise confound our findings. In particular, it allows 
us to rely on complete contracts, restricting the role of our judges to squarely enforcing the terms of 
the exchange without playing any role in defining them ex post. It also allows us to focus on third-
party enforcement, ruling out self-enforcement and relational contracts.  
It is tempting to establish parallelisms between our treatments and different allocations of voting 
and enforcement rights in the field. At their most general, our treatments might be suggestive of 
different forms of democracy, in which the third-party enforcers (either the government, the 
judiciary, or both) are directly controlled by different social groups. Our results could thus 
contribute to the literature on the links between democracy, the rule of law, and growth (Barro, 
1996). They also hint that certain forms of education might promote growth by alleviating the 
enforcement problem.  
When extrapolating from the experiment, one must keep in mind, however, the implicit set of 
assumptions about reality embedded in the specificities of the experimental design. In particular, 
our design of borrower constituency could resemble a malfunctioning democracy, but future work 
may reveal that the poor performance of borrower constituency is reversed by allowing 
communication, or by having borrowers vote before lenders decide to lend or not, or by letting 
borrowers implement some commitment device.  
Our GDP treatment can itself be interpreted as a commitment device because experimental 
voters cannot change the role and compensation of enforcers. It therefore resembles societies with 
effective separation of powers, especially those with (1) an independent judiciary where judges’ 
careers are uncoupled from the short-term desires of their constituencies; and (2) voters who are 
quite responsive to economic performance (the “It’s the economy, stupid” of the first Bill Clinton 
campaign). In the field, both of these institutions show varying performance, however, and this 
diversity might also result in the experiment if judges’ compensation were modified to resemble 
fixed judicial salaries or short-term political horizons.  
Last, our design of lender constituency apparently resembles an elitist democracy or an 
oligarchy of the sort prevalent in the 19th century or more recently in some Asian countries.  It is 
left for future work to determine, however, the extent to which outcomes of the lender constituency 
treatment depend on our implicit assumptions about enforcement. Our experimental subjects enjoy 
decision rights on the enforcement of contracts but cannot modify the endowments, because we 
implicitly assume perfect and cost-free enforcement of property rights (that is, endowments are not 
expropriable by political action). Were we to introduce more consistent assumptions about 
imperfect enforcement of both contractual and property rights, one may conjecture a tradeoff 
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between both imperfections, making borrower constituency more effective and lender constituency 
less effective than under our assumptions.  
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Table 1. Experimental treatments 
Treatments Use of robots Date 
Number of 
participants 
in parts 1 
and 2 
Participants 
in part 3 
Length of 
part 3 
(periods) 
Lender 
constituency None 
12 Apr 06 18 15 37 
18 Apr 06 18 15 29 
Borrower 
constituency None 
2 Mar 06 15 15 22 
7 Mar 06* 18 15 37 
8 Mar 06 18 15 25 
Robot 
lenders  
and robot 
judges 
3 Mar 06 6 5 30 
23 Feb 06* 6 5 20 
26 Apr 06 6 5 29 
GDP  
None 
28 Feb 06 15 15 27 
 1 Mar 06 15 15 24 
 9 Mar 06 18 15 22 
 19 Apr 06 18 15 23 
 Robot 
lenders  
and robot 
borrowers 
19 Feb 06 6 5 35 
 21 Feb 06 6 5 20 
 24 Apr 06 6 5 23 
Totals  15 sessions 189 165 26.9  (average) 
Notes: part 1: Static preferences for efficiency and equity; part 2: Guessing game; part 3: Judicial enforcement of 
transactions. *A $4 show-up fee was paid in these sessions and no show-up fee was paid in all other sessions 
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Table 2. Preferences for equality 
 Earnings options 
A B C 
Person 1 8.0 11.0 12.0 
Person 2 (decision-maker) 8.0 8.5 9.0 
Person 3 8.0 4.5 3.0 
Total points 24 24 24 
Frequency of choices,  
N = 165 
63 
38.2% 
22 
13.3% 
80 
48.5% 
Notes: Self-regarding agents should choose C.  
The table includes subjects that participated in part 3 only. 
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Table 3. Preferences for efficiency 
 Earnings options 
D E F 
Person 1 20.5 12.0 7.5 
Person 2 (decision-maker) 6.5 7.0 7.5 
Person 3 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Total points 32 24 19 
Frequency of choices,  
N = 165 
52 
31.5% 
30 
18.2% 
83 
50.3% 
Notes: Self-regarding agents should choose F.  
The table includes subjects that participated in part 3 only. 
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Table 4. Market surplus and the distribution of market earnings by treatment 
  
GDP Borrower constituency
Lender 
constituency
Robot  
GDP 
Robot 
borrower 
constituency 
Market surplus  
(min 0%, max 100%):      
Periods 1–10 57.5% 23.3% 86.0% 68.0% 38.0% 
Periods 11–20 69.0% 10.0% 100.0% 96.7% 40.0% 
Session average* 66.2% 13.1% 95.8% 86.4% 37.6% 
Borrowers’ share of market  
earnings (min 21%, max 50%):      
Periods 1–10 34.4% 27.8% 33.3% 32.7% 28.4% 
Periods 11–20 33.2% 24.0% 33.0% 36.9% 30.0% 
Session average* 34.1% 24.9% 33.1% 36.0% 29.1% 
Absolute earnings of borrowers  
(min 16, max 50 tokens):      
Periods 1–10 30.96 22.69 32.15 30.28 24.39 
Periods 11–20 30.79 18.83 33.00 36.63 25.75 
Session average* 31.37 19.68 32.74 34.78 24.84 
Notes: Surplus is defined as the average payoff of all lenders and borrowers minus their initial endowment of 76 
tokens (60+16). The average number of loans can be obtained by dividing the market surplus by 20%, i.e. 
100%/20% equals 5 loans. * All periods.  
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Table 5. Levels of enforcement decisions by judges and voting by lenders and borrowers 
 
GDP Borrower constituency
Lender 
constituency
Robot  
GDP  
Robot 
borrower 
constituency 
Enforcement rate, both  
voluntary and judicial: †      
Periods 1–10 49.3% 33.8% 90.2% 71.0% 35.3% 
Periods 11–20 69.3% 37.0% 100.0% 73.9% 36.6% 
Session average 62.2% 38.5% 97.3% 70.9% 35.7% 
Voluntary compliance by 
borrowers:      
Periods 1–10 7.3% 8.9% 22.2% 0.0% 14.4% 
Periods 11–20 13.7% 13.3% 11.0% 0.0% 23.2% 
Session average 10.9% 15.3% 17.1% 0.0% 19.5% 
Judges’ enforcement and lenders’ 
and borrowers’ voting      
Judges enforcing 3.10 1.87 5.00 3.73 1.93 
Lenders voting for enforcement 4.43 3.27 5.00* n/a n/a 
Borrowers voting for enforcement 0.85 1.50* 0.70 n/a 1.93 
Equal borrower/lender outcome:^^       
Periods 1–10 1.53 0.80 0.45 0.80 0.97 
Periods 11–20 0.90 0.33 0.00 1.23 1.17 
Session average 1.21 0.43 0.14 1.21 1.05 
Notes: † The lender zero-profit threshold is ER* = 58.8%. * Votes had payoff consequences for judges. 
^^ Average number of 50/50 split earnings per period. 
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Table 6. Guessing game and iterations of reasoning 
Iterations of  
reasoning 
Choice in the  
guessing game 
Number of  
subjects % 
0 [66.67, 100] 23 13.9% 
1 (44.45, 66.67] 37 22.4% 
2 (26.63, 44.45] 64 38.8% 
3 or more [0, 26.63] 41 24.9% 
Totals [0, 100] 165 100% 
Notes: Choices from part 2 of the experiment, classified as in Nagel (1995), with all subjects that participated in part 
3 included. Each subject had to guess a target equal to two thirds of the average of three real number targets guessed 
by herself and two other subjects between 0 and 100. The Nash equilibrium is zero. 
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Table 7. Judges’ decisions in the GDP treatment 
(Dependent variable: 1 = judge ruled for enforcement, 0 = otherwise) 
Independent  
variables: 
With humans as lenders and borrowers With robots as lenders  and borrowers 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods only 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods only 
All  
periods 
All  
periods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Voluntary return rate in 
previous period 
-0.5323 - -0.5157 - - - 
(0.4583)  (0.4322)    
Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero 
iterations of reasoning 
-1.5542 -0.9755 - - † - 
(0.3612)*** (0.3253)***     
Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero or one 
iterations of reasoning 
- - 0.0182 0.2404 - -0.8881 
  (0.3561) (0.4250)  (0.6932) 
1/period -2.6695 -0.5741 -2.5952 -0.5725 -1.3816 -1.1345 
 (0.9341)
*** (0.6138) (0.9092)*** (0.6141) (0.4969)*** (0.4748)** 
Constant 0.6696 0.0589 0.3971 -0.0368 1.1877 1.3301 
 (0.3653)
* (0.3598) (0.3687) (0.4246) (0.6194)* (0.7252)* 
No. obs. 460 210 460 210 370 390 
No. subjects 20 20 20 20 15 15 
Notes: Probit regressions (in columns) with robust estimator clustered around individuals. Pivotal periods are those in which each 
judge’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not reaching the zero-profit enforcement threshold, ER*. † Regressor dropped because 
it perfectly predicted ruling against enforcement (structural zeroes). When (6) is run on only pivotal periods (regression not 
included in this table), the dummy variable for iterations of reasoning also dropped because of structural zeroes. Session dummies 
are included in the regression but not reported in the table. Period 1 excluded in (1) and (3) because of the lag regressor. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 33
Table 8. Borrowers’ voting in borrower constituency 
(Dependent variable: 1 = borrower voted for enforcement, 0 = otherwise) 
   
Independent  
variables: 
With humans as lenders and judges With robots as lenders and judges 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods 
only 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods 
only 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods 
only 
All  
periods 
Pivotal 
periods 
only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Voluntary return rate  
in previous period 
-0.2265 - -0.2297 - -0.7765 - -0.8834 - 
(0.3980)  (0.3978)  (0.4485)*  (0.4956)*  
Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero 
iterations of reasoning 
-0.3056 † - - -0.6768 -1.2462 - - 
(0.1979)    (0.5717) (0.6769)*   
Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with 0 or 1 
iterations of reasoning 
- - 0.1802 -0.2113 - - -1.0734 -1.0814 
  (0.3127) (0.5996)   (0.3443)*** (0.4573)** 
1/period -0.1037 -0.3766 -0.0735 -0.3317 0.6865 0.9692 0.7510 1.0791 
 (0.9532) (0.4944) (0.9377) (0.4462) (0.8853) (1.1841) (0.9513) (1.2288) 
Constant -0.9359 -0.3591 -1.0268 -0.6105 0.2212 -0.1199 0.9760 0.4949 
 (0.3275)
*** (0.2805) (0.3288)*** (0.3414)* (0.3869) (0.4761) (0.3837)** (0.5236) 
No. obs. 405 148 405 160 380 190 380 190 
No. subjects 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: Probit regressions (in columns) with robust estimator clustered around individuals. Pivotal periods are those in which each 
borrower’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not reaching the zero-profit enforcement threshold, ER*. † Regressor was dropped 
because it perfectly predicted ruling against enforcement (structural zeroes). Session dummies are included in the regression but 
not reported in the table. Period 1 excluded in (1), (3), (5), and (7) because of the lag regressor. * Significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1. Modified trust game of part 3 
 
accommodates
Lender
enforces
lends
Judge
Borrower
defaultscomplies
saves
Lender’s earnings:     60 – 10 + 17 = 67
Borrower’s earnings:  16 + 34* – 17 = 33
60 – 10 + 0 = 50
16 + 34* – 0 = 50
60 – 0 + 0 = 60
16 + 0 – 0 = 16Earnings: 
Lender 60-10+17=67  60-10+17=67   60-10+ 0=50            60- 0+ 0=60 
Borrower 16+34-17=33  16+34-17=33   16+34- 0=50            16+ 0- 0=16  
Judge πjk (depends  πjk (depends   πjk (depends            πjk (depends  
on treatment)  on treatment)   on treatment)            on treatment) 
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Figure 2. Average number of loans by treatment  
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Notes: Periods 11–20 only. Aggregate surplus is zero with zero loans and reaches its full potential with five loans 
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Figure 3. Borrowers’ share of total earnings 
0.33
0.24
0.33
0.37
0.30
21%
25%
29%
33%
37%
GDP Borrower
constituency
Lender
constituency
Robot GDP Robot
borrower
constituency
B
or
ro
w
er
s' 
sh
ar
e 
of
 s
ur
pl
us
 
Note: Periods 11–20 only 
 37
Figure 4. Absolute earnings of borrowers 
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Figure 5. Time profile of robot borrower constituency sessions 
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Figure 6. Time profile of borrower constituency sessions with human lenders 
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Figure 8. Voting and judges’ enforcement decisions 
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Notes: Periods 11–20 only. In bold, opinions with payoff consequences.  
